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I. Introduction
It is estimated that in the year 2011 alone, 822,300 American males were diagnosed with
some form of cancer.1 While cancer treatment undoubtedly has improved, achieving higher
success rates for cancer patients, such treatment often yields its own set of health-related risks.2
For instance, chemotherapy and radiation—two widely-prescribed forms of cancer treatment—
commonly cause damage to sex organs and, consequently, sterility in men.3 As a result, many
men undergoing such treatment, who wish to later have the ability to father a child, often elect to
bank, or store, their sperm before treatment begins.4 This practice offers sterile cancer survivors
a viable and often equally-effective alternative for fathering a child, and allows many couples to
fulfill their dream of starting a family. However, in the unfortunate case where treatment is
ineffective, and the male cancer patient does not survive, the use of his stored sperm to
posthumously conceive a child can raise a host of legal issues. One such issue, which, until
recently, had divided the United States Courts of Appeal, involves the right of posthumously
conceived children, or lack thereof, to collect child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act.
The Social Security Act (or “the Act”), among other things, authorizes the payment of
insurance benefits to dependent children of deceased wage-earners.5 However, because the Act
fails to make clear the rights of children conceived posthumously,6 circuit courts addressing the
issue had interpreted the Act and determined benefit eligibility inconsistently, leaving
posthumously conceived children entirely dependent on a particular court’s interpretation.
American Cancer Society, Cancer Facts & Figures 2011, AM. CANCER SOC’Y 4, 10 (2011),
http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@epidemiologysurveilance/documents/document/acspc-029771.pdf.
2
Reshma L. Mahtani, Male Sterility, CARING4CANCER (Aug. 15, 2010),
https://www.caring4cancer.com/go/cancer/effects/lesscommon/sterility.htm.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012).
6
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2004).
1

1

Perhaps surprisingly, much of the dispute dividing the courts had centered around the issue of
whether posthumously conceived children are considered “children” for purposes of benefit
eligibility and how that determination should be made.
While the United States Supreme Court has now resolved this question,7 the circuit courts
that previously had addressed the issue generally adopted one of two positions. The Fourth and
Eighth Circuits had held that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)–(B) and (h)(3),
posthumously conceived children must be able to inherit from the decedent under state intestacy
law, or satisfy certain exceptions to that requirement, in order to qualify as “children” for
insurance benefit purposes.8 The Third and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, had interpreted the
statute broadly, taking the position that a couple’s undisputed natural children plainly fall within
42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1)’s basic definition of “child,” thereby making the children eligible for
child’s insurance benefits and their state intestacy rights irrelevant.9
The issue of posthumously conceived children’s rights to child’s insurance benefits under
the Social Security Act undoubtedly will become more and more relevant as reproductive
technologies further advance and the number of children conceived posthumously continues to
grow. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s resolution of the matter, this Comment articulates
several reasons why, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court was correct in
aligning with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits and interpreting the Social Security Act—at least as
it is currently written—narrowly, thus allowing posthumously conceived children to qualify for
child’s insurance benefits only if they can inherit from the deceased wage-earner under state
intestacy law. The Comment, however, goes on to suggest that, while perhaps consistent with

7

See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 50–51 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012).
9
Id.
8

2

principles of statutory interpretation, the current text of the statute is inconsistent with the
legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage.
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of modern reproductive technologies
and posthumous conception. Part III will discuss the Social Security Act, its history, and child’s
insurance benefits under the Act. Part IV will discuss the recently resolved circuit split regarding
the issue of whether posthumously conceived children are entitled to child’s insurance benefits
under the statute. Part V will address why, pursuant to principles of statutory interpretation, the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of the Act, at least as it is currently written, correctly
required courts to look to state intestacy law when determining an applicant’s “child” status for
purposes of benefit eligibility. Part VI will discuss the recent Supreme Court decision that
resolved the circuit split over the issue of posthumously conceived children’s right to child’s
insurance benefits. Part VII will argue that although the Act, as it is currently written, has been
construed correctly by the Supreme Court and Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the statute is poorly
drafted and fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage.
Lastly, Part VII will propose a solution to this dilemma—namely that Congress revisit and
amend the Social Security Act so that it both corresponds with the Act’s legislative purpose and
is clearer for courts tasked with interpreting it in the context of posthumously conceived
children.
II. Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Posthumous Conception
Assisted reproductive technologies (“ART”) have allowed many couples, who would
otherwise be precluded from doing so, to have biological children.10 Transforming the way
society views reproduction as well as the reproductive lives of many couples, these various

10

Emily Galpern, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Overview And Perspective Using A Reproductive Justice
Framework, CENTER FOR GENETICS AND SOC’Y, 1 (Dec. 2007), http://geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/ART.pdf.
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technologies and techniques afford prospective parents not only the ability to have children, but
also the ability to determine when they would like to have children.11 For this reason, ART are
often utilized by men and women that are either terminally ill or at risk of becoming infertile,
such as cancer patients receiving chemotherapy or radiation treatment. Among other things,
ART allow these men and women to retain their reproductive options post-treatment and even
post-death.12
While ART encompasses a variety of technologies that promote pregnancy;13 the most
common in the posthumous conception context are cryopreservation, artificial insemination, and
in vitro fertilization.
a. Cryopreservation
Commentators largely agree that the availability of ART primarily is attributed to the
development of a process known as cryopreservation.14 Cryopreservation is the “process of
slowly freezing bodily materials so that they can be used at a future date.”15 In the ART context,
the procedure generally involves sperm, ova, or embryos—all of which can be frozen for
extended periods until needed.16

Cryopreservation of these reproductive cells provides

prospective parents the ability and luxury of postponing the decision to conceive to some later,
more convenient time.17

11

Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Survivor’s Benefits for
Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 257 (1999).
12
Galpern, supra note 10, at 10.
13
Although this Comment will attempt to describe some of the many reproductive technologies available to
prospective parents, an in-depth analysis of such technologies and techniques is beyond the scope of this paper.
14
Banks, supra note 11, at 257; John Doroghazi, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart and Unanswered Questions About
Social Security Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597, 1600–01 (2005).
15
Galpern, supra note 10, at 10.
16
Id. The cyropreservation of both sperm and embryos is a well-established practice. Sperm was first frozen in
1949, and it has been possible to freeze embryos since 1983. EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 163–64
(2001).
17
Galpern, supra note 10, at 10.
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Experts have determined that frozen sperm remains viable for at least ten years.18 Some
experts believe it can remain viable for more than one-hundred years.19 As discussed in greater
detail below, a man’s frozen sperm can later be thawed and used for insemination or to fertilize
ova in vitro.20 For this reason, cryopreservation, when combined with reproductive procedures
such as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization, makes it possible for children to be
conceived posthumously, i.e., after one (or both) biological parents is dead.21
b. Artificial Insemination
One of the earliest,22 simplest and least expensive techniques available to prospective
parents is the process of artificial insemination (“AI”), which “refers to several different
procedures, all of which involve inserting sperm into the female’s body.”23 Although all such
procedures fall under the umbrella of “artificial insemination,” the processes differ with respect
to whether sperm is placed in the woman’s vagina, uterus, cervix or fallopian tubes.24

While

prospective couples may choose AI for a myriad of reasons, the practice is most frequently used
“to combat male infertility,”25 that is, AI is primarily utilized to assist in reproduction “when a
man has stored some of his sperm prior to undergoing medical treatment, such as chemotherapy,
that will render him infertile.”26
AI, which can be performed at home or in a more traditional medical setting, is regarded

18

Banks, supra note 11, at 270.
Doroghazi, supra note 14, at 1601 (citing Jamie Rowsell, Stayin’ Alive Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance
Rights, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 400, 401 (2003)).
20
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON & D. KELLY WEISBERG, ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 267 (2009).
21
Id.
22
See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the process of artificial
insemination has been performed on animals for centuries).
23
Galpern, supra note 10, at 9.
24
Id.
25
Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous
Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 549 (1996).
26
JACKSON, supra note 16, at 164.
19
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as a very simple procedure.27 On average, seven insemination attempts over 4.4 menstrual
cycles are required to initiate pregnancy.28 To increase the couple’s likelihood of success, sperm
is typically “washed” before it used, meaning it is separated from semen, dead or slow sperm,
and/or any chemicals that may impair fertilization.29 In all, approximately forty percent of
artificially inseminated women become pregnant.30
While AI is particularly successful—due to the fact that it “mimics what happens during
coital reproduction”31—success rates can vary depending on various factors such as the age of
the woman; the means by which the sperm is inseminated; whether the sperm is “washed” or
“unwashed;” the overall quality of the sperm; and whether AI is used in conjunction with
hormonal drugs.32
c. In Vitro Fertilization
First successfully performed on a mouse ovum in 1958,33 in vitro fertilization (“IVF”)
offers couples a last-resort alternative to coital reproduction.34 Because IVF tends to be highly
invasive, women generally attempt other less-invasive methods of assisted reproduction before
turning to IVF and related procedures.35 Nevertheless, it is estimated that one percent of children
in the U.S.—often referred to as “test tube babies”—are born using IVF.36 The first IVFproduced child was Louise Brown, born in England in 1978.37
Unlike AI, IVF typically involves fertilization of the human egg, or ova, outside the

27

Galpern, supra note 10, at 9; Shah, supra note 25, at 549.
Shah, supra note 25, at 549.
29
Galpern, supra note 10, at 9.
30
Shah, supra note 25, at 549 (citing Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of
Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 58 (1994)).
31
Id.
32
Galpern, supra note 10, at 9.
33
JACKSON, supra note 16, at 167 (citation omitted).
34
Shah, supra note 25, at 549.
35
Galpern, supra note 10, at 9.
36
Id.
37
Shah, supra note 25, at 549.
28
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woman’s body.38 Specifically, during the IVF procedure, eggs are produced either during the
woman’s natural menstrual cycle or with the assistance of a hormonal drug treatment, which
stimulates egg production.39

The eggs are then removed from the woman, either

laparoscopically or through transvaginal aspiration, and placed in a culture that allows them to
further mature.40

After being mixed in a petri dish with either fresh sperm or thawed,

cryogenetically frozen sperm, the eggs become fertilized.41 The fertilized ova—known as a
preembryo—subsequently are inserted into either the woman’s uterus, cervix or fallopian tubes,
or are frozen via cryopreservation for future use.42 It is estimated that one-half of IVF patients
freeze and store their pre-embryos.43
Each of the above reproduction methods, as well as others outside the scope of this
Comment,44 has made posthumous conception possible. Regardless of the specific method
employed, however, the legal status of a child conceived by artificial means after either one or
both parents have died remains largely unsettled. Indeed, as noted above (and in further detail
below) one important right at stake in the context of posthumous conception, until recently, had
been posthumously conceived children’s right to child’s insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act.
III. Overview of the Social Security Act and Child’s Insurance Benefits
The following sections provide an abbreviated history of the Social Security Act and
38

Id.; Galpern, supra note 10, at 9.
Shah, supra note 25, at 549.
40
Id. at 549–50; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 166.
41
Shah, supra note 25, at 550; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 166.
42
Shah, supra note 25, at 549; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 166.
43
Shah, supra note 25, at 550.
44
For example, gamete intrafallopian transfer―another variation of IVF where the woman’s egg and a large number
of sperm are placed directly into the woman’s fallopian tubes rather than a petri dish. It has been said that
“[b]ecause fertilization occurs naturally in the fallopian tubes . . . it is assumed that the tube is ‘a better incubator
than a Petri dish . . . .’” Erica Howard-Potter, Beyond Our Conception: A Look at Children Born Posthumously
Through Reproductive Technology and New York Intestacy Law, 14 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 23, 28 (2006) (citation
omitted).
39
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child’s insurance benefits.45
a. An Overview of Social Security
In the midst of the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression, and under the leadership
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,46 Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935.47 The
Act’s purpose was to provide monthly benefit payments, i.e., old-age insurance, to workers who
had reached a certain age and met other established criteria.48 The Act, regarded as a “social
insurance” program, “sought to address the long-range problem of economic security for the
aged through a contributory system in which the workers . . . contributed to their own future
retirement benefit[s] by making regular payments into a joint fund.”49
b. Child’s Insurance Benefits
In 1939, Congress amended the Social Security Act.50 Whereas the original Act provided
only retirement benefits, and only to the primary worker,51 the 1939 Amendments added two
new categories of benefits, one of which was “survivors benefits paid to the family in the event
of the premature death of a covered worker.”52 These fundamental additions, among other
things, “transformed Social Security from a retirement program for workers into a family-based

To some, the term “social security” encompasses “not only social insurance but also welfare programs generally.”
ARTHUR ABRAHAM & DAVID L. KOPELMAN, FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY 3 (1979). For those that subscribe to this
interpretation, “social security” may include, among other things, “general assistance, old-age assistance, assistance
to families with dependent children, public health programs, aid to the blind and disabled and vocational
rehabilitation.” Id. Throughout this Comment, however, the term “social security” will be limited in scope to social
insurance programs, specifically survivor’s insurance. Other programs that may reasonably fall under the
“umbrella” of social security are, for the most part, outside the ambit of this paper.
46
Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last modified Jan. 10, 2013).
47
Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012).
48
ABRAHAM & KOPELMAN, supra note 45, at 3.
49
Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 46.
50
Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957.
51
MARGARET C. JASPER, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 5 (2d ed. 2004).
52
Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 46. The term family, for these purposes,
typically consists of the widows, children, and parents of the deceased worker. ABRAHAM & KOPELMAN, supra note
45, at 3.
45
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economic security program.”53
One particular provision of the 1939 Amendments, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §
402(d), authorized the payment of “child’s insurance benefits” to the children of deceased
workers. The purpose of these benefits was “not to provide general welfare benefits, but to
‘replace the support that the child would have received from his [parent] had the [parent] not
died.’”54
In order to be eligible for child’s insurance benefits today, a child must meet the criteria
outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).55 Specifically, “the child or his guardian must have filed an
application for child’s insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration.”56 The child
must also satisfy other substantive criteria: the child must be “unmarried and either under certain
age limits or subject to a disability,” and must have been “dependent upon [the insured decedent]
. . . at the time of [the decedent’s] death . . . .”57 In a subsequent provision, the Act provides that
“[a] child shall be deemed dependent upon [the insured decedent at the time of his death] unless,
at such time, such individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child” and
either “such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual,” or “such child
has been adopted by some other individual.”58
Before even reaching these inquiries, however, an applicant, as a threshold matter, must
establish something more fundamental: that he or she is the insured’s “child” within the meaning

53

Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 46.
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507–08, 514–15
(1976); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater, 101 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the purpose of federal child
insurance benefits is not to benefit minor children as such but . . . to replace the support that the child would have
received from his father had the father not died.”).
55
Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957.
56
Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(A)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680
(2012).
57
Id. at 51–52 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B), (C)(ii)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (emphasis added).
54
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of the Act.59 The Act’s basic grant of benefits provides that “[e]very child (as defined in section
416(e) of this title) . . . of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual . . . shall
be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit…”60 In pertinent part, section 416(e) of the Act defines
the term “child” as “the child or legally adopted child of an individual.”61 However, admittedly
“sparse,”62 if not completely ambiguous, section 416(e)’s definition of child has, until recently,
sparked much debate in the context posthumously conceived children’s right to benefits under
the Act.
While some courts, such as the Third and Ninth Circuits, have found section 416(e) to
provide a sufficient definition of “child” for purposes of determining benefit eligibility,63 other
courts, like the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”),64 have determined that subsequent provisions of the Act “bear[] on the
determination of child status.”65
Section 416 of the Act, entitled “Additional definitions,” includes subsection 416(h),
entitled “Determination of family status,” which states in pertinent part:
In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall
apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal
property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the
time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts
of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured
individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of
Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to
59

Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).
61
Id. § 416(e)(1).
62
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
63
See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
64
As is discussed in greater detail below, the Social Security Act gives the Commissioner of Social Security
rulemaking authority. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (“The Commissioner of Social Security
shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with
the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt
reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and
evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.”)
65
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
60
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taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.

66

In light of section 416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy requirement, the Commissioner of the SSA has
interpreted the Act to provide that a child of a deceased wage earner is not entitled to benefits
unless he or she has inheritance rights under state law or can satisfy certain additional statutory
requirements.67
For those children that cannot establish “child” status through section 416(h)(2)(A)’s
intestacy provision, section 416(h) provides three additional gateways to benefits.68

First,

pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B), an applicant who “is a son or daughter of a fully or currently
insured individual,” but who cannot inherit from that individual under state intestacy law, is
deemed a “child” if his or her parents went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported
marriage that later turned out to be legally invalid.69 Second, a child who is unable to inherit
from a deceased insured under state intestacy law is nevertheless deemed a “child” under the Act
if, prior to death the insured wage-earner, the wage-earner had acknowledged parentage in
writing; had been decreed the child’s parent by a court; or had “been ordered by a court to
contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant [was the insured individual’s
child].”70 Third, a child who is barred from inheriting under state intestacy law is nevertheless
deemed a “child” if the insured decedent is shown by “evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner
of Social Security” to have been the parent of the applicant, and to have been “living with or
contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.”71

66

42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012).
68
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
69
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B); see also Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
70
Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(III) (internal subsection divisions omitted); see also Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
71
Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii); see also Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
67
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IV. Circuit Court Decisions Addressing Posthumously Conceived Children’s Right to
Child’s Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act.
As noted above, section 416(e)’s definition of child had created a divide among the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, particularly in the context of posthumously conceived
children’s right to child’s insurance benefits under the Act.
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,72 for instance, the Ninth Circuit—the first circuit court to
consider the issue—held, among other things, that the provisions under section 416(h) of the Act
“do not come into play for the purposes of determining whether a claimant is the “child” of a
deceased wage earner unless parentage is in dispute.”73 In other words, where it can be shown
that the claimant is the biological child of the deceased wage earner, i.e., that parentage is
undisputed, the court need not look to section 416(h) or state intestacy laws to determine “child”
status.74
Similarly, in Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the Third Circuit held that the
provisions under section 416(h) are relevant only “where a claimant’s status as a deceased wageearner’s child is in doubt,” and that the “term ‘child’ in § 416(e) requires no further definition
when all parties agree” that the applicant is the “biological offspring” of the decedent.75
In Schafer v. Astrue,76 the Fourth Circuit took a different approach than the Ninth and
Third Circuits. There, the court held that the SSA’s interpretation—that section 416(h) of the
Act provides the analytical framework that must be followed in determining whether an applicant
is a “child” for purposes of benefit eligibility—best reflects the Act’s history, text, structure, and
purpose, and that “even if the agency’s interpretation were not the only reasonable one,” it is to

72

371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
Id. at 595, 597 (emphasis added).
74
Id. at 599.
75
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
76
641 F.3d 49.
73
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be accorded deference.77
In Beeler v. Astrue,78 the most recent circuit court case to address the issue, the Eighth
Circuit similarly agreed with the SSA’s interpretation that “a natural child of the decedent is not
entitled to benefits unless she has inheritance rights under state law or can satisfy certain
additional statutory requirements.”79

Like the Fourth Circuit, the court noted that the

Commissioner’s interpretation was, “at a minimum, reasonable and entitled to deference.”80
With respect to posthumously conceived children specifically, the court held that section
416(h)(2)(A) “clearly directs the Commissioner to determine the [child’s] status . . . by reference
to state intestacy law.”81
We now turn to an in-depth discussion of these critical appellate decisions.
a. Ninth Circuit: Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart
In December 1994, Robert Netting (“Netting”) was diagnosed with cancer.82 Doctors
informed Netting that chemotherapy might render him sterile.83 As a result, prior to starting
treatment, Netting decided to freeze and store his semen for later use by his wife, Rhonda GillettNetting (“Gillett-Netting”).84
In February 1995, Netting lost his battle with cancer.85 Prior to his death, however,
Netting reiterated that he wanted his wife to have their child after his death using his frozen
semen.86 Using in vitro fertilization, Gillett-Netting gave birth to two children in August 1996.87
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Approximately two weeks after giving birth, Gillett-Netting, on behalf of her two
children, filed an application for Social Security child’s insurance benefits based on Netting’s
earnings.88 The SSA denied the claim both initially and upon reconsideration, and GillettNetting subsequently filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”).89
Like the SSA, the ALJ denied Gillett-Netting’s claim, finding that the children were not
entitled to benefits because they “were not dependent on Netting at the time of his death.”90
Noting that the last possible time to determine whether one is dependent upon a wage-earner is
the date of that wage-earner’s death, the ALJ held that “children conceived after the wage
earner’s death cannot be deemed dependent on the wage earner.”91 Gillett-Netting subsequently
filed a complaint in district court, claiming that the decision to deny her children child’s
insurance benefits was not supported by substantial evidence, was not in accordance with the
law, and denied them equal protection of the law.92
Granting summary judgment in favor of the SSA, the district court held that GillettNetting’s children did not qualify for child’s insurance benefits because they were not Netting’s
“children” for purposes of the Act, and because they were not dependent upon Netting at the
time of his death.93 The district court also held that the SSA’s denial of benefits did not violate
the children’s right to equal protection.94 Gillett-Netting subsequently appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.95
Recognizing that “no circuit court [had] previously considered the novel issue presented
88

Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. (citing Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965–69 (D. Ariz. 2002)).
94
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
95
Id.
89

14

in [the] case,” the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s decision to deny child’s
insurance benefits to Gillett-Netting’s children.96 Stating that the Commissioner’s denial of
benefits may be set aside “when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record,” the court began its analysis by noting that “[d]eveloping
reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which currently do not address
directly the legal issues created by posthumous conception.”97 The court further pointed out that
“[n]either the Social Security Act nor the Arizona family law that is relevant to determining
whether [Gillett-Netting’s children] have a right to child’s insurance benefits makes clear the
rights of children conceived posthumously.”98
Turning first to the issue of whether Gillett-Netting’s posthumously conceived children
were “children for purposes of the Act, the court recited the basic provisions of section
402(d)(1).99 The court found that it was undisputed that Netting was fully insured when he died;
that Gillett-Netting’s two children were Netting’s biological children as well as unmarried
minors; and that Gillett-Netting had filed an application for insurance benefits on the children’s
behalf.100 The court then referenced section 416(e)’s definition of “child,” asserting that the
Social Security Act defines the term “child” broadly.101 The court noted that “[c]ourts and the
SSA have interpreted the word ‘child’ used in the definition of ‘child’ to mean the natural, or
biological, child of the insured.”102

Rejecting the SSA Commissioner and district court’s

assertion that the term “child” is further defined by sections 416(h)(2) and (3), the court held that
those sections of the Act were added merely “to provide various ways in which children could be
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entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married or their parentage was in dispute.”103
The court also concluded that the provisions were irrelevant to the present issue because, while
sections 416(h)(2) and (3) offer a means of establishing “child” status under the Act where the
child’s parentage is disputed, “nothing in the statute suggests that a child must prove parentage
under § 416(h) if [parentage] is not disputed.”104
Thus, pointing out that the Commissioner had conceded that the children at issue were
Netting’s biological children, and emphatically reiterating that the provisions under section
416(h) “do not come into play for the purposes of determining whether a claimant is the “child”
of a deceased wage earner unless parentage is in dispute,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
district court had erred when it held that Netting’s posthumously conceived children were not his
“children” for purposes of the Act.105
The court next turned to the issue of whether Gillett-Netting’s children, “the undisputed
biological children of a deceased, insured individual, are statutorily deemed dependent on
Netting without proof of actual dependency.”106 The court noted that, under the Act, “a claimant
must show dependency on an insured wage earner in order to be entitled to child’s insurance
benefits.”107 Agreeing with the district court that Netting’s posthumously conceived children
were not in existence at the time of Netting’s death and, therefore, could not demonstrate actual
dependency, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the Act statutorily deems broad categories of
children to have been dependent on a deceased, insured parent without demonstrating actual
dependency.”108
Citing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as section 402(d)(3) of the
103

Id.
Id. at 596–97 (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
106
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597–98.
107
Id. at 598 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)).
108
Id.
104

16

Act, the court noted, “[i]t is well-settled that all legitimate children automatically are considered
to have been dependent on the insured individual, absent narrow circumstances not present in
this case.”109 The court added that illegitimate children who prove parentage under sections
416(h)(2) and (3) are similarly deemed to be the legitimate children of the insured decedent and,
therefore, also are “deemed to have been dependent on the deceased wage earner.”110 The court
subsequently proclaimed that the purpose of section 416(h) and its sub-provisions is not to prove
parentage, but to prove dependency.111 Adding that “the Act is construed liberally to ensure that
children are provided for financially after the death of a parent” and that “[d]ependency is a
broad concept under the Act,” the court concluded that “the vast majority of children are
statutorily deemed dependent on their deceased parents” and that “only completely
unacknowledged, illegitimate children must prove actual dependency in order to be entitled to
child’s insurance benefits.”112
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, the court found that Gillett-Netting’s posthumously
conceived children were “undisputedly Netting’s legitimate children under the law of the state in
which they reside.”113 Explaining that Arizona had eliminated the status of illegitimacy, the
court found that “[u]nder Arizona law, Netting would be treated as the natural parent of [GillettNetting’s children] and would have a legal obligation to support them if he were alive, although
they were conceived using in-vitro fertilization, because he is their biological father and was
married to the mother of the children.”114 The court added that, although Arizona law does not
specifically address posthumously conceived children, every child in the state—which
necessarily includes Gillett-Netting’s children—is the legitimate child of his or her natural
109
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parents.115
While the court again rejected the Commissioner’s contention that Gillett-Netting’s
children were not “legitimate children” and, therefore, could not be deemed “dependent” under
section 402(d)(3) unless they also were able to inherit from the decedent under state intestacy
law (or one of the other provisions of section 416(h)), the court did point out that its holdings
would not apply “[i]f the sperm donor had not been married to the mother.”116 Absent a marital
relationship between the child’s parents, the court said, “no eligibility for benefits would exist
unless the Commissioner made a determination that the claimant was the dependent child of the
deceased wage earner for purposes of the Act by virtue of satisfying one of the requirements in §
416(h).”117
Despite its qualified holding, however, the court reiterated that “[w]hile § 416(h)
provides alternative avenues for children to be deemed legitimate, nothing in the Act suggests
that a child who is legitimate under state law [must separately] prove legitimacy under the
Act.”118 The court observed that, as a practical matter, legitimate children typically will be able
to inherit under state intestacy laws, but “they need not demonstrate their ability to do so in order
to be entitled to child’s insurance benefits.”119 Opining that “[i]t would make little sense to
require a child whose parents were married to demonstrate legitimacy by showing she meets a
test set forth in § 416(h),” the court concluded that it need not consider whether Netting’s
children could be deemed “dependent” for some other reason, such as their ability to inherit from
Netting under Arizona intestacy laws.120
Having determined that the posthumously conceived children were Netting’s legitimate
115
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children under Arizona law and, therefore, were deemed dependent on Netting under section
402(d)(3) of the Act, the court held that the children were entitled to child’s insurance
benefits.121
b. Third Circuit: Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Robert Capato was diagnosed with esophageal cancer in August 1999.122 Soon thereafter,
Mr. Capato was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile.123 Thus, Mr.
Capato decided to freeze and store his sperm for future use so that he and his wife could retain
their reproductive options post-treatment.124
Mr. Capato’s health began deteriorating in 2011, and he passed away in March 2002.125
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Capato (“Capato”) attempted in vitro fertilization using the stored, frozen
sperm of her deceased husband.126 The procedure was successful, and Capato gave birth to twins
in September 2003—eighteen months after Mr. Capato’s death.127
The following month, Capato applied for child’s social security insurance benefits on
behalf of her twins.128 The SSA, however, denied her claim.129 Capato subsequently requested a
hearing before an ALJ, which was held in May 2007.130 But the ALJ also denied Capato’s
request for benefits.131
The ALJ found that Capato’s twins, conceived after the death of their father, were “not for
Social Security purposes the ‘child(ren)’ of the deceased wage earner . . . under Florida state law
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as required by section [4]16(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act” and, therefore, were not entitled
to child’s insurance benefits under the Act.132 The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and
Capato subsequently appealed.133
On appeal, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision to uphold the denial of
benefits de novo.134 Citing Third Circuit precedent, the court noted that “[w]here the ALJ’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if
we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”135
Observing that the reproductive technologies at issue in the case “were not within the
imagination, much less the contemplation, of Congress when the relevant sections of the [Social
Security Act] came to be” and that “they present a host of difficult legal and even moral
questions,”136 the court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he purpose of ‘federal child
insurance benefits’ is not to provide general welfare benefits, but to replace the support that the
child would have received from his father had the father not died.”137 The court further stated
that “[t]he Act is to be accorded a liberal application in consonance with its remedial and
humanitarian aims.”138
After reciting the text of sections 416(h)(2) and (h)(3) and stating that 416(h)’s subprovisions merely offer “other ways by which to determine whether an applicant is a ‘child’” for
purposes of the Act, the Third Circuit rejected the provisions’ applicability to the case at bar.139
The court explained, “Were we to determine that the § 416(h)(2)(A) definition of ‘child’ is
appropriate here and go on to apply the law of intestacy of Florida, as the Commissioner argues
132
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we should, we would affirm [the denial of benefits].”140 However, the court added that “neither
the Commissioner nor the District Court, who agreed with the Commissioner, ha[d] told [the
court] why, in the factual circumstances of this case, where there is no family status to
determine, [the court should] even refer to § 416(h).”141
The court explained that to accept the Commissioner’s argument—that section 416(h)
provides the analytical framework that courts must follow for determining whether a child is the
insured’s “child” for purposes of benefits eligibility—“one would have to ignore the plain
language of § 416(e) and find that the biological child of a married couple is not a ‘child’ within
the meaning of § 402(d) unless that child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the domicile of
the decedent.”142 Aligning itself with the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that there was no
reason for such an interpretation.143
Pointing out that the Commissioner had conceded that Capato’s twins were her late
husband’s biological children, the court cited Gillett-Netting for the proposition that section
416(h)’s sub-provisions have “no relevance for determining whether a claimant is the ‘child’ of
the deceased wage earner where parentage is not in dispute.”144 The court also noted that in
response to Gillett-Netting, the Commissioner had issued an “Acquiescence Ruling,” limiting the
application of Gillett-Netting to claims within the Ninth Circuit.145 In a “Statement as to How
Gillett-Netting Differs From SSA’s Interpretation of the Social Act,” contained in the
Acquiescence Ruling, the Commissioner argued that “in all cases, § 416(h) provides the

140

Capato, 631 F.3d at 630.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
145
Id. An acquiescence ruling “explains how [the SSA] will apply a holding in a decision of a United States Court
of Appeals that [it determines] conflicts with [its] interpretation of a provision of the Social Security Act or
regulations when the Government has decided not to seek further review of that decision or is unsuccessful on
further review.” Id. at 631 n.4.
141

21

analytical framework that [courts] must follow for determining whether a child is the insured’s
child for the purposes of section [416(e) ]” and that section “416(h)(2)(A) directs the application
of state intestacy law or the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 416(h)(3)(C) to
determine whether a child is a ‘child.’”146 The Commissioner also asserted that “[a]n ‘afterconceived’ child . . . cannot satisfy the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and
416(h)(3)(C),” and, therefore, “to meet the definition of ‘child’ under the Act, an ‘afterconceived’ child must be able to inherit under State law.”147
Rejecting the Commissioner’s argument that all children, “even including children of
married parents whose parentage [is] not in dispute,” must satisfy “at least one of the provisions
of section 416(h),” as well as the Commissioner’s justifications grounded in legislative history,
the Third Circuit held that “[t]he plain language of §§ 402(d) and 416(e) provides a threshold
basis for defining benefit eligibility” and that the provisions under section 416(h) are relevant
only “where a claimant’s status as a deceased wage-earner’s child is in doubt.”148 The court
explained that a basic tenet of statutory construction “is that in the absence of an indication to the
contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.”149 With respect to the Act, the court found that the “term ‘child’ in § 416(e) requires
no further definition when all parties agree that the applicants here are the biological offspring of
the Capatos.”150 The court, however, limited its holding to the facts of the present case, stating
“[w]e acknowledge that another factual scenario might render the Commissioner’s concerns
more persuasive.”151
Emphatically concluding that the “undisputed biological children of a deceased wage
146
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earner and his widow [are] ‘children’ within the meaning of the Act,” the court vacated the order
of the district court in part and remanded for a determination of whether the children were
dependent or deemed dependent on Mr. Capato at the time of his death.152
c. Fourth Circuit: Schafer v. Astrue
Four months after Don Schafer Jr. married Janice in June 1992, he was diagnosed with
cancer.153

Like Mr. Netting and Mr. Capato, Mr. Schafer was told that the chemotherapy he

required might render him sterile.154 As a result, he deposited sperm with a long-term storage
facility.155 Mr. Schafer subsequently died of a heart attack in March 1993.156
In April 1999, through the use of in vitro fertilization, Janice Schafer (“Schafer”)
conceived a child.157

She gave birth to that child in January 2000.158

Although born

approximately seven years after Mr. Schafer’s death, substantial evidence indicated that Mr.
Schafer was the child’s biological father and that he intended for Schafer to use his stored sperm
to conceive the child after his death.159 Mr. Schafer, however, never expressed his consent to be
the legal father of the posthumously conceived child in writing.
In 2004, Schafer, on behalf of her child, applied to the SSA for child’s insurance benefits
under the Social Security Act.160 The ALJ initially awarded Schafer’s child the benefits she
requested; however, the SSA’s Appeals Council subsequently reversed the decision, finding that
the child was not a “child” for purposes of the Act because he was unable to inherit from Mr.
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Schafer under Virginia intestacy law.161 The district court upheld the SSA’s denial of benefits,
and Schafer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.162
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit—before establishing the various criteria of section
402(d)(1)—began by noting that an applicant seeking child’s insurance benefits under the Act
must first establish something more fundamental: “that he is the insured’s ‘child’ within the
meaning of the Act.”163 Asserting that “Section 416(e)(1) . . . is not the only provision of the Act
that bears on the determination of child status,” the court observed that the SSA “has always
required applicants claiming natural child status—including the undisputed biological children of
married parents—to pass through one of § 416(h)’s pathways to secure that status.”164
The court subsequently summarized the parties arguments.165 It noted that, under the
SSA’s view, section 416(h) of the Act provides the “analytical framework” that must be
followed in determining whether an applicant is a “child” for purposes of section 416(e)(1)’s
definition.166 Moreover, posthumously conceived children are entitled to benefits only if they
can inherit under state intestacy law.167 Thus, according to the SSA, Schafer’s child was entitled
to child’s insurance benefits under the Act only if he could inherit from Mr. Schafer under
Virginia intestacy law.168 Because Virginia law “does not recognize any child born more than
ten months after the death of a parent as that parent’s child for intestacy purposes,” the SSA
denied Schafer’s claim.169
Citing Gillett-Netting, Schafer claimed that section 416(h)’s provisions do not apply to
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children “whose parentage . . . is not disputed.”170 Schafer explained that “§ 402(d) refers
explicitly to § 416(e), not § 416(h), in defining ‘child.’”171 Thus, under Schafer’s view, §
416(e)(1)’s plain terms covered an undisputed biological child of the insured decedent and,
therefore, her child’s ability to inherit from Mr. Schafer under Virginia intestacy law was
irrelevant to determining his child status.172
Addressing the parties “warring” interpretations, the court first engaged in a two-prong
inquiry, derived from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).173 The court first asked, as Chevron step one, “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.”174 The court noted that if Congress has spoken directly
to the precise question at issue, an agency “would not be free to counter Congress’s command,
and the courts must uphold faithful interpretations and reject disobedient ones.”175 However, the
court added that “where a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, a
reviewing court at Chevron step two asks whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”176
With respect to Chevron step one, the court concluded that, while the plain language of
the statute is “the most reliable indicator of congressional intent,” and “the plain meaning of
‘child’ in § 416(e)(1) might seem necessarily to include the biological children of those who,
because of tragic circumstances, could only become parents after their death,” rejecting the
SSA’s interpretation of the Act would be “unsound.”177 The court reasoned that the “traditional
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tools of statutory construction” demonstrated that Congress intended for the SSA to use state
intestacy law for purposes of determining “child” status under the Act.178 The court added that,
even if Congress did not precisely speak to the question, “the SSA’s reasonable interpretation is
entitled to deference”.179
The court next examined the pertinent provisions of the Act.180 Opining that “[s]ection
416(e) itself is notably brief,” and observing that other circuits had found that the section’s
“definitional tautology does not provide much guidance as to how the SSA should go about
making th[e] child status determination,” the court concluded that Congress intended the SSA to
apply the Act as it always had—by applying state intestacy law to determine child status and
benefit eligibility.181 Moreover, the court noted that the Ninth and Third Circuits “have been
willing to elevate the sparse definition found in § 416(e)(1) and to completely de-emphasize the
more extensive definition found in § 416(h)(2)(A), thereby treating Congress’s more
comprehensive efforts as a mere afterthought.”182 In doing so, the court added, these circuits had
overlooked Congress’ “plain and explicit instruction on how the determination of child status
should be made”—by applying “such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of
intestate personal property.”183
Emphasizing that the term child “lies at the core of the Act’s benefit program,” the court
commented that it would be “startling” if Congress had not provided “greater guidance on child
status than set forth in § 416(e)(1).”184 The court also stated that the Gillett-Netting and Capato
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courts’ contentions could not be correct.185 It reasoned that the Ninth and Third Circuits’
argument—that “because ‘child’ ordinarily means ‘natural child,’ § 416(e)(1) independently
provides child status to those children whose natural, or biological parentage is not disputed”—
would “attribute inconsistent views about child status to . . . Congress.” 186 Observing that each
sub-provision of section 416(h) requires an applicant for benefits to demonstrate both that the
insured was the child’s biological parent and some additional condition, the court concluded that
a showing of undisputed biological parentage could not be sufficient to establish child status
under section 416(e)(1) because “it would have made no sense for Congress to require those
whose parentage was initially disputed but was then resolved to prove something in addition to
biological parentage.”187

The court explained that Congress would not have imposed an

additional proof requirement on the undisputed child of the insured if undisputed biological
parentage were sufficient under section 416(e)(1).188
The court also rejected the Ninth and Third Circuits’ attempt to add an additional
requirement to section 416(e)(1).

According to the court, “Capato and Gillett–Netting

alternatively hint that the class of children independently provided child status by § 416(e)(1) is
comprised of the undisputed biological children of married parents.”189 The court responded by
noting that “whatever their legal rights may be, out-of-wedlock children are indisputably the
natural children of their biological parents under the ordinary English usage of the term.”190
Therefore, the court said, “Capato and Gillett–Netting cannot state that § 416(e)(1) covers the
children of only married couples without contradicting their earlier claim that § 416(e)(1)’s
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supposedly obvious usage of ‘child’ meant all natural children.”191 The court also reiterated that
section 416(h)(2)(A) contains no suggestion that it is limited to disputed or out-of-wedlock
children.192 Instead, the provision “specifically addresses itself to the child status determination
that must take place in evaluating every benefits application.”193
Finding that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act followed “to the letter Congress’s
explicit and precise instruction as to how the agency should determine child status” and “makes
sense of the statute as a whole” rather than “focusing myopically on a single term,” the Fourth
Circuit held that the SSA’s view was “dutiful and faithful to Congress’s intent.”194
The court also concluded that the SSA’s interpretation was consistent with the Act’s
legislative history and Congress’ wishes, noting, among other things, that some version of
section 416(h)(2)(A) has always been included in the Act’s statutory scheme—thus “weakening
any inference that it is just a new way for disputed children to gain child status.”

195

The court

observed that a detailed look at the Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress viewed section
416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy provisions to be the “backbone of all child status determinations” and
that “Congress understood the Act’s framework as requiring all natural children to pass through
§ 416(h) to claim child status.”196
Furthermore, the court determined that the SSA’s interpretation best comports with the
purposes of the Act.197 The court stated that “[t]he Act is not a welfare program generally
benefiting needy persons, but rather an effort to provide the . . . dependent members of [a wage
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earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings.”198 The
court recognized that the Act thus creates a “core beneficiary class”—“the children of deceased
wage earners who relied on those earners for support”—and that “[t]he SSA’s interpretation, by
tying natural child status determinations to one of § 416(h)’s pathways, [consequently] reflects
the Act’s basic aim of primarily helping those children who lost support after the unanticipated
death of a parent.”199 Although the Fourth Circuit found that posthumously conceived children
differ from the core beneficiary class—primarily in that they necessarily could not have relied on
the decedent’s wages prior to his death200—the court noted that the SSA’s interpretation
“properly includes as children those posthumously conceived children whom state lawmakers
conclude are similarly situated enough to more traditionally conceived children that they deserve
a share in the decedent's estate.”201
Finding that Schafer’s interpretation contravened the Act’s purpose by threatening the
core beneficiary class and that “[t]he text, legislative history, purpose, and prior judicial
approaches to the Act” supported its conclusion, the court held that Congress intended for the
SSA to use state intestacy law in determining child status and benefit eligibility.202
The court subsequently engaged in a Chevron step two analysis, inquiring as to whether
the Act was silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue at bar and, if so, whether the
SSA’s interpretation was based on a permissible construction of the statute.203 The court first
determined that “[e]ven if one were to disagree that the Act dictates the SSA’s interpretation, the
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considerable evidence for the SSA’s view at least demonstrates statutory ambiguity.” Among
other things, the court reasoned that “§ 416(h)(2)(A)’s clear instruction and comprehensive
approach significantly undermines the view that § 402(d)’s basic grant and § 416(e)(1)’s sparse
definition independently confer child status on undisputed children.”204
Because the court found the Act to be at least ambiguous, it stated that it could not
disturb the decision of an agency at Chevron step two “unless it was arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”205 Explaining that “deference of this sort stands
at the heart of modern administrative law” and that it “ensures that agency officials, who . . .
possess greater relevant expertise than judges, take the lead in implementing programs delegated
to their care,” the court held that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act easily passed muster under
Chevron.206 The court reasoned that the SSA “has extensive experience in administering the
Act’s survivorship benefits program, as well as the legal and practical ability to respond more
quickly to changing regulatory circumstances.”207 The court further reasoned that the SSA
“faces political checks from Congress and the President, likely keeping its policymaking within
the bounds of the democratically acceptable.”208 Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined that, at
least in the present case, it would be “well advised to leave the fine-tuning of statutory regimes to
others.”209
In sum, the court—recognizing that “states have demonstrated a legislative willingness to
account for the new biological world in which we find ourselves,” and that jettisoning the SSA’s
approach would “thrust the federal courts into a myriad of other issues, including policy-driven
questions about . . . child status”—held that it would not “disturb [the] long-lived effort at
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federal-state cooperation, especially where the SSA’s construction of the Act seems not only
permissible, but also correct.”210
d. Eighth Circuit: Beeler v. Astrue
Bruce and Patti Beeler were married in December 2000.211 Shortly before the wedding,
however, Bruce was diagnosed with acute leukemia.212 Advised to undergo chemotherapy, but
informed that such treatment could cause sterility, Bruce arranged to store his sperm at a fertility
clinic so that he and his wife could later have children.213
In February 2001, after being hospitalized for an infection, Bruce turned his attention to
the disposition of his banked sperm.214 Bruce signed a hospital form in which he bequeathed his
sperm to Patti (or “Beeler”) and provided that only she could use the sperm in the event of
Bruce’s death.215 Bruce and Patti also signed a hospital form providing that the couple desired
Patti to be inseminated with Bruce’s sperm for the purpose of conceiving a child, and that Bruce
accepted and acknowledged paternity and child support responsibilities for any resulting child.216
Two days after signing the forms, Bruce underwent a bone marrow transplant, which was
unsuccessful.217 Bruce passed away in May 2001.218
Approximately one year after her husband’s death, Beeler conceived a child after
undergoing intra-uterine insemination.219 The child was born in April 2003.220 Bruce was listed
as the father on the child’s birth certificate, and it was undisputed that the child was Bruce’s
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biological daughter.221
In June 2003, Beeler applied for child’s insurance benefits on behalf of her daughter.

222

However, the SSA ultimately denied the application as well as a request for reconsideration.223
Beeler subsequently requested a hearing before an ALJ.224
Following a hearing in March 2008, the ALJ sent the case to the SSA’s Appeals Council
with a recommendation that Beeler’s child was not entitled to benefits.225 The Appeals Council,
“based on its review and application of the Act, regulations, rulings, and acquiescence rulings,”
issued an decision determining that Beeler’s child was not Bruce’s “child” within the meaning of
the Social Security Act and, therefore, was not entitled to benefits.226
In February 2009, Beeler sued the Commissioner of Social Security in district court,
seeking a review of the SSA’s denial of child’s insurance benefits.227

The district court

ultimately reversed the SSA’s decision, remanding the case to the agency with instructions to
calculate and award benefits to Beeler’s child.228 The Commissioner subsequently appealed to
the Eighth Circuit.229
Following a discussion regarding the history of the Social Security Act, its relevant
provisions, and the criteria a child must satisfy in order to qualify for insurance benefits, the
Eighth Circuit noted that it was undisputed that Bruce was fully insured at the time of his death;
that an application for benefits had been filed on the child’s behalf; and that the child was
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unmarried and under eighteen years old.230 The court also acknowledged that the parties had
agreed that if Beeler’s child qualified as a “child” under any provision of section 416(h), she
automatically satisfied the Act’s dependency requirement.231
Observing that the parties’ dispute centered on the relationship between sections 416(e)
and 416(h) of the Act, as well as various SSA regulations implementing those provisions, the
court set forth the applicable standard of review.232 The court stated that it would review the
district court’s decision de novo and would affirm the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “if
substantial evidence in the record as a whole support[ed] the decision, and the Commissioner
correctly applied the relevant legal standards.”233 The court further stated that whether the
SSA’s position―that section 416(h) “is the exclusive means by which an applicant can qualify
for ‘child’ status as a natural child within the meaning of § 416(e)”―is correct is a question of
statutory interpretation and would also be reviewed de novo.234
Like the Fourth Circuit, the court subsequently pointed out that “when Congress has
delegated authority to an administrative agency to interpret and implement a federal statute,” the
court gives “the agency’s interpretation deference pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.”235 Under Chevron, the court noted, an agency’s view “governs
if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only possible interpretation,
nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts.”236
Noting that the Social Security regulations were established “pursuant to the
Commissioner’s statutory authority to promulgate rules that are ‘necessary or appropriate to
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carry out’ his functions and the relevant statutory provisions,” the court began examining those
SSA regulations pertaining to “child” status.237 The court specifically highlighted 20 C.F.R. §
404.355―entitled “Who is the insured’s natural child?”―which provides that “you may be
eligible for benefits as the insured’s natural child if any of the following conditions is met.”238
That statement, the court noted, “is followed by a list of four conditions for ‘natural child’ status
that closely track the statutory criteria for ‘child’ status in § 416(h)(2)(A), § 416(h)(2)(B), and §
416(h)(3).”239 The court observed that the regulations provide “different sets of qualifications
for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren, who—unlike natural
children—are not required to satisfy one of the relevant provisions of § 416(h).240
The court next laid out the parties respective arguments.

It noted that, in the

Commissioner’s view, “the [SSA’s] regulations confirm that an applicant can qualify as a natural
‘child’ within the meaning of § 416(e) only by meeting one of the criteria outlined in §
416(h).”241 In Beeler’s view, however, the relevant SSA regulation “does not exclude the
possibility that ‘natural child’ status can be established by other means, such as an undisputed
biological relationship,” because the “regulation says ‘you may be eligible for benefits as a
natural child’ if certain conditions are met,” as opposed to stating that the four listed criteria are
the exclusive means of acquiring “natural child” status.242
Finding no latent ambiguity, the court determined that the regulations “make clear that
the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of § 416(h) are the exclusive means by
which an applicant can establish ‘child’ status under § 416(e) as a natural child.”243 The court
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reasoned that it would not make sense for the SSA “to promulgate a regulation dedicated
specifically to answering the key question—“Who is the insured’s natural child?”—and then to
omit one prominent answer.”244 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the SSA used the phrase
“may be eligible” for benefits because an applicant must also meet additional requirements with
respect to dependency, age, and marital status in order to qualify for child insurance benefits.245
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court also noted that, “[e]ven if there were a sliver of
ambiguity in the regulations, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”246 Thus, according to
the court, the Commissioner’s interpretation easily passed muster and was entitled to Chevron
deference.247
Also finding that provisions of the agency’s policy manual did not conflict with the
SSA’s longstanding position—that all children seeking benefits must attain “child” status “by
satisfying the criteria outlined in § 416(h)(2)(A), § 416(h)(2)(B), or § 416(h)(3)”—the court next
addressed whether the SSA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable.248

The court

concluded that “[t]he text of the statutes favors the Commissioner’s position.”249 The court
reasoned that “[o]n its face, § 416(h)(2)(A) clearly directs the Commissioner to determine the
status of a posthumously conceived child by reference to state intestacy law” and that the text
“could hardly be more clear.”250
The court also rejected Beeler’s arguments that a biological child is necessarily a “child”
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under section 416(e), and that section 416(h) was irrelevant to her child.251 The court reasoned
that although sections 416(e) and 416(h) do not refer to one another, and section 402(d)(1)
“requires an applicant to qualify as a ‘child’ ‘as defined in section 416(e)’” without mentioning
section 416(h), these points were “insufficient to establish unambiguously that a posthumously
conceived biological child is necessarily a ‘child’ under § 416(e).”252 This conclusion was
fortified, the court said, because “Congress elsewhere required proof beyond undisputed
biological parentage to obtain ‘child’ status under § 416(e),” such as in sections 416(h)(2)(B) and
(h)(3)(C)(ii).253

Thus, the court concluded that if Beeler’s interpretation—that undisputed

biological parentage alone is sufficient—were correct, “then the statutory provisions requiring
more evidence in some cases would be superfluous.”254
Lastly, the court rejected the Ninth and Third Circuit’s reading of the Act’s legislative
history, as well as Beeler’s argument that her child qualified as a “child” under section
416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I) of the Act.255
Finding that the Social Security Act permits, if not requires, the SSA’s interpretation, the
court held that, as the law now stands, “it resolves the question of eligibility for child’s insurance
benefits by reference to state intestacy law.”256 The court concluded that the Commissioner’s
denial of child’s insurance benefits “was supported by reasonable construction of the governing
statutes and regulations, and by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”257 Thus, the
district court’s decision was reversed.258
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V. The Letter of the Law
In the context of posthumously conceived children, the Social Security Act, as it is
currently written, should be construed as requiring courts to look to state intestacy law to
determine “child” status for purposes of benefit eligibility.
a. Why the Fourth and Eighth Circuits “Got It Right”
The Ninth Circuit, in Gillett-Netting, asserted that the Social Security Act “defines ‘child’
broadly to include any [natural or biological] ‘child or legally adopted child of an individual,’”
and that the following subsections merely were “added to the Act to provide various ways in
which children could be entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married or their
parentage was in dispute.”259 In fact, the court concluded that the sub-provisions have no
relevance unless the child’s parentage is disputed.260
The Third Circuit, in Capato, reached the same conclusion.261. The court held that, so
long as the benefit applicant is the biological offspring of the deceased wage earner and his or
her widow, “[t]he term “child” in § 416(e) requires no further definition.”262
The Ninth and Third Circuits’ interpretation, as the Supreme Court ultimately
recognized,263 is flawed. It implies that, even in the present era of developing reproductive
technologies, the meaning of the word “child” is so self-evident that courts do not need help
interpreting it. This simply is not the case. Even in the limited context of biological children of
validly married parents, where there supposedly is “no family status to determine,”264 “child”
status remains a hotly contested issue. As even the Third Circuit acknowledged, “The use of
259
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donor eggs, artificial insemination, and surrogate wombs could result in at least five potential
parents.”265
Furthermore, the Ninth and Third Circuits’ reading renders section 416(h) entirely
superfluous.266 The Fourth Circuit presents perhaps the best illustration of this point, stating:
In § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), Congress provided child status to a child who cannot inherit but
who can prove both that the insured was the child’s parent and that the insured was
‘living with or contributing to’ the child at the time of death. But if undisputed biological
parentage is enough under § 416(e)(1), it would have made no sense for Congress to
require those whose parentage was initially disputed but was then resolved to prove
something in addition to biological parentage.267

The court followed with a second illustration. It noted that section 416(h)(2)(B) of the
Act “grants child status to a non-inheriting child only if he or she is the son or daughter of [the]
insured—demonstrating that parentage is no longer in dispute—and if his or her parents went
through a legally invalid marriage ceremony.”268 Clearly, if undisputed biological parentage
alone were sufficient, the statutory provisions requiring additional criteria to be satisfied would
be unnecessary.269
The Ninth and Third Circuits suggested that the class of children afforded “child” status
by section 416(e)(1) is comprised specifically of the undisputed biological children of married
parents.270 But this undermines the courts’ insistence that the plain English meaning of “child”
drove their views, inasmuch as non-marital children are in fact children..271 Thus, the Ninth and
Third Circuits’ interpretation is incorrect and should be rejected.
While it is true that section 402(d) explicitly refers to section 416(e), not section 416(h),
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in defining “child,” and that neither subsection refers to the other, this dilemma is more apparent
than real.272 Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit asserted, “it is not at all unusual for Congress to refer
explicitly only to one section even though some of that section’s terms are given their full import
by another, unmentioned section.”273
As the Fourth Circuit noted, the term “child” lies at the heart of the Act’s benefit
program.274 For that reason, it would be particularly startling if Congress failed to provide
further guidance on the issue of “child” status than that set forth in section 416(e)(1).275
Thankfully, Congress did not leave courts in the dark about such a critical term. The plain text
of section 416(h) provides all the guidance that is needed.
b. Section 416(h)(2)(A): The Primary, If Not Exclusive, Means By Which Posthumously
Conceived Children May Qualify As “Children” Under the Act
As noted above, all children applying for child’s insurance benefits must satisfy one of
the four criteria of section 416(h) in order to attain “child” status under the Act. However, the
statute instructs courts to look first to state intestacy law in making “child” status determinations:
“In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured individual for
purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would
be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State
in which such insured individual . . . was domiciled at the time of his death . . . .”276
While sections 416(h)(2)(B) and (h)(3) of the Act also provide gateways to “child” status,
courts may apply these provisions only after applying state intestacy law, according to the text of
the statute. Section 416(h)(2)(B) states in relevant part, “If an applicant is a son or daughter of a
fully or currently insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured
272
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individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child
of such insured individual” if certain conditions are met.277 The provision, among other things,
provides alternative pathways for children to qualify as “children” under the Act, even if they
lack inheritance rights under state intestacy law.
Similarly, section 416(h)(3) of the Act is to be applied only after both provisions of
section 416(h)(2) have been tested. Among other things, the provision states, “An applicant who
is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed
to be) the child of such insured individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall
nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual” if certain conditions are
met.278
As the foregoing demonstrates, Congress clearly intended for the provisions of sections
416(h)(2) and (h)(3) to be applied in the order in which they appear in the statute. Nevertheless,
and although a child technically can attain “child” status by satisfying any of the four criteria of
section 416(h), section 416(h)(2)(A) may be the exclusive means by which posthumously
conceived children can attain “child” status. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, because the
insured parent of a posthumously conceived child, by definition, died prior to the child’s
conception, parentage could not have been acknowledged, decreed, or ordered prior to the
insured wage earner’s death.279 Thus, it is impossible for a posthumously conceived child to
attain “child” status under sections 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(III) of the Act. Likewise, because a
posthumously conceived child—again, by definition—could not have been living with or
receiving contributions from the decedent when the decedent passed away,280 it is impossible for
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him or her to attain “child” status under section 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
Although it theoretically is possible for a posthumously conceived child to attain “child”
status pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B)—as the child may be able to demonstrate (1) that
parentage is undisputed, and (2) that his or her parents went through a legally invalid marriage
ceremony—such a result is highly unlikely. Not only, as the Third Circuit observed,281 might
establishing undisputed parentage pose significant problems for posthumously conceived
children, but twenty-first century marriage ceremonies in the U.S. rarely will be found to be
legally invalid. Moreover, even in the rare instance where a posthumously conceived child can
establish the required elements of section 416(h)(2)(B), that child still will have to satisfy the
provisions of section 402(d), which itself is no easy task. Due to the difficulty a posthumously
conceived child is likely to encounter in attempting to establish the criteria of sections
416(h)(2)(B) and 402(d), attaining “child” status pursuant to these provisions is highly
improbable.
For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits were correct to hold, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, that the Act, as it currently is written, grants social security
insurance benefits to posthumously conceived children only if they qualify as “children” under
their respective state’s intestacy statutes.
VI. The Supreme Court Aligns with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
Granting certiorari on the issue in November 2011, the United States Supreme Court, in
May 2012, once and for all resolved the question of whether posthumously conceived children
“rank as ‘child[ren]’ under the Act’s definitional provisions” in Astrue v. Capato ex rel.
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B.N.C.282 The case, on appeal from the Third Circuit and once again focusing on Mr. and Mrs.
Capato’s posthumously conceived twins, was decided unanimously.283
Upon acknowledging that “[t]he technology that made the twins’ conception and birth
possible . . .was not contemplated by Congress when the relevant provisions of the Social
Security Act . . . originated (1939) or were amended to read as they now do (1965),” the Court
aligned with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits and held that the SSA’s reading of the statute—
entitling “biological children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the decedent
under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement”—is
“better attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the
deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime.” The Court further held that “even if the SSA’s
longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction
that garners the Court’s respect under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.”284
The Court reasoned that “[n]othing in § 416(e)’s tautological definition . . . suggests that
Congress understood the word ‘child’ to refer only to the children of married parents,” and that
“elsewhere in the Act, Congress expressly limited the category of children covered to offspring
of a marital union.”285 Likewise, the Court noted that “marriage does not ever and always make
the parentage of a child certain, nor does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s
parentage is uncertain.”286
Rejecting the Third (and Ninth) Circuit’s interpretation, the Court further observed that
section 416(e) fails to “indicate that Congress intended ‘biological’ parentage to be [a]
282

132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
Id. at 2025. For a detailed discussion of the facts and procedural history of the underlying case, see generally
Capato, 631 F.3d 626.
284
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
285
Id. at 2029–30.
286
Id. at 2030.
283

42

prerequisite to ‘child’ status,” and that “laws directly addressing use of today’s assisted
reproduction technology do not make biological parentage a universally determinative
criterion.”287 Nevertheless, the Court added that even if it were to accept Capato’s proposed
definition—“biological child of married parents”—it is far from obvious that Capato’s
posthumously conceived twins would be covered.288 Indeed, “[u]nder Florida law, a marriage
ends upon the death of a spouse,” the Court noted.289 Thus, “[i]f that law applie[d], rather than a
court-declared preemptive federal law, the Capato twins, conceived after the death of their father,
would not qualify as ‘marital’ children.”290
With respect to how section 416(h)(2)(A)’s instructions fit into the “child” status
analysis, the Court reiterated Capato’s argument that section 416(e) lacks any cross-reference to
section 416(h).291 The Court, however, emphasized that Capato “overlooks . . . that § 416(h)
provides the crucial link.”292 The Court stated that
[t]he ‘subchapter’ to which § 416(h) refers is Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§
401 through 434. Section 416(h)’s reference to ‘this subchapter’ thus includes both §§
402(d) and 416(e). Having explicitly complemented § 416(e) by the definitional
provisions contained in § 416(h), Congress had no need to place a redundant crossreference in § 416(e).293

Accordingly, the Court concluded that “[r]eference to state law to determine an applicant’s status
as a ‘child’ is anything but anomalous.,”294 Just the opposite, “[t]he Act commonly refers to
state law on matters of family status.”295 The Court discovered that “as originally enacted, a
single provision mandated the use of state intestacy law for ‘determining whether an applicant is
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the . . . child . . . of [an] insured individual.”296 Similarly, the Court explained that “requiring all
‘child’ applicants to qualify under state intestacy law installed a simple test, one that ensured
benefits for persons plainly within the legislators’ contemplation, while avoiding congressional
entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of family relations.”297
The Court also emphasized that “[t]he paths to receipt of benefits laid out in the Act and
regulations . . . proceed from Congress’ perception of the core purpose of the legislation.”298 The
Act’s aim, the court noted, “was not to create a program ‘generally benefiting needy persons’; it
was, more particularly, to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with
protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.’”299 Thus,
according to the Court, “[r]eliance on state intestacy law to determine who is a ‘child’ . . . serves
the Act’s driving objective.”300 To be sure, the court acknowledged, “the intestacy criterion
yields benefits to some children outside the Act’s central concern.”301 Nonetheless, it was
“Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality of cases.”302
Additionally rejecting Capato’s Equal Protection claim,303 the Supreme Court held that
section 416(h)(2)(A) . . . completes the definition of ‘child’ “for purposes of th[e] subchapter’
that includes § 416(e)(1).”304 The Court further concluded that “[t]he SSA’s interpretation of the
relevant provisions, adhered to without deviation for many decades, is at least reasonable,” and,
therefore, the agency’s reading—which the Court found to be neither arbitrary nor capricious—
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“is . . . entitled to th[e] Court’s deference under Chevron.”305 The Court thus reversed the Third
Circuit’s ruling.306
VII.

Beyond the Letter of the Law
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the Supreme Court, have construed the Social

Security Act as it currently is written correctly. That is, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
the Act technically should be interpreted as requiring courts to look to state intestacy law to
determine “child” status. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the foregoing, this article contends
that the statute is poorly drafted and fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose
underlying the Act’s passage.
As courts have recognized, the Social Security Act of 1935 was never intended to be a
“welfare program generally benefiting needy persons,”307 but rather an effort to tackle head on
the burgeoning problem of economic security for the elderly.308

Based primarily, if not

exclusively, on the concept of social insurance, this contributory system—like many social
insurance programs—was intended to provide economic security by “pooling risk assets from a
large social group and providing income to those members of the group whose economic security
[was] imperiled . . . by . . . cessation of work due to old age.”309
Although the Act was amended in 1939, expanding both coverage and benefits to retired
workers, their spouses and children, and to survivors,310 the amendments’ purpose was not to
provide general welfare benefits to the public,311 but to function as an insurance policy,
305
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providing “protection to the [American] worker and to [dependent members of] his family
against the loss of earning because of retirement . . . or death.”312 With respect to child’s
insurance benefits specifically, the 1939 amendments sought to replace the support that a
dependent child would have received from his or her parent had the parent not died.313 The
drafters thus created a core beneficiary class: the children of deceased wage earners who
depended on those earners for support.314
While the Ninth and Third Circuits’ interpretation of the Act undoubtedly covered the
members of this core beneficiary class, their approach, as the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
observed, was over-inclusive and, therefore, overshot the legislative purpose underlying the
Act’s passage. As noted above, child’s insurance benefits were added to the Act not to provide
general welfare assistance or subsidize parents’ decision to reproduce, but “to provide support to
children who have lost ‘actual’ or ‘anticipated’ support.”315 The Act’s underlying purpose thus
suggests that all benefit applicants should be required to demonstrate a level of actual
dependency on the wage earner as a prerequisite to benefits.
However, while “regularly-conceived,” biological children of married parents likely can
satisfy this prerequisite—as they are alive prior to the wage earner’s death and, therefore, likely
were dependent on the wage earner—the same cannot be said about posthumously conceived
children. As the Fourth Circuit aptly noted, posthumously conceived children, by definition, are
not in existence at the time of the wage earner’s death and, therefore, “necessarily could not have
First, “benefits are paid only on the basis of work and earnings to individuals who have worked and earned and to
their dependents and survivors.” Second, “benefits are based on the amount of earnings, whether from covered
employment or covered self-employment . . . Need plays no part in determining eligibility for, or amount of,
benefits.”).
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quotation marks omitted); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The Social Security Act authorizes
the payment of benefits to the dependent children of deceased workers.”) (emphasis added).
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relied on the wage earner’s wages.”316 By awarding “child” status to any undisputedly biological
child of married parents and automatically deeming these “legitimate” children dependent, the
Ninth and Third Circuits’ interpretation, as the Fourth and Eighth Circuits observed, overlooked
this critical point. Indeed, overextending coverage to children outside the core beneficiary class,
such as posthumously conceived children, treats child’s insurance benefits more akin to subsidies
for parents’ reproductive plans or general welfare assistance than insurance for unexpected
losses. It therefore ignores the drafters’ aim of providing benefits primarily to those “who
depended on the support of a wage-earner and lost that support due to the wage-earner’s
death.”317
While the Supreme Court’s (and the Fourth and Eighth Circuits’) “solution” to this
dilemma has been to interpret the Act as requiring benefit applicants to satisfy one of the
provisions outlined in section 416(h) in order to claim “child” status, this approach, while
perhaps correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, and certainly effective in reducing the
number of eligible applicants, also is inconsistent with the Act’s legislative purpose, particularly
in the context of posthumously conceived children.
Indeed, section 416(h)(2)(A), which is the primary, if not exclusive, means by which
posthumously conceived children can qualify as “children” under the Act, does not make the
benefit applicant’s level of actual dependency on the deceased wage-earner, or lack thereof, the
focal point of its inquiry. Instead, the provision relies on state intestacy statutes in making
“child” status determinations.

While this approach may provide a definitive answer as to

whether or not an applicant is entitled to benefits—or at least an analytical framework to apply in
making this determination—it is problematic. In addition to the fact that intestacy laws may
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differ in every state,318 leaving the decision as to whether or not benefit applicants attain benefits
to state legislatures, the statutes are intended to reflect the presumed intent of a decedent who has
not had an opportunity to draw up a will,319 not the policies underlying the Social Security Act
and child’s insurance benefits. The statutes thus do not consider whether a child was actually
dependent on the decedent’s earnings. As a result, a child who actually was dependent on the
decedent but could not inherit pursuant to the intestacy laws of the state in which the wage earner
died automatically may be denied financial support, contrary to the drafters’ aim of helping
children who lost support after the unanticipated death of a parent.

To be sure, sections

416(h)(2)(B) and (h)(3) of the Act attempt to address this problem and increase the number of
applicants who are eligible for child’s insurance benefits. However, for many of the reasons
articulated by the Ninth and Third Circuits,320 even these provisions are lacking.
Likewise, by relying on the presumed intent of the decedent, which intestacy laws seek to
replicate, section 416(h)(2)(A) and the Supreme Court’s and Fourth and Eighth Circuits’
approach treats child’s insurance benefits not as what they are—insurance against the loss of
actual or anticipated support due to a wage earner’s death—but rather as assets to be given away
or withheld.

For this reason, the courts’ approach, again, is inconsistent with the Act’s

legislative purpose. Through taxes paid while employed, a wage earner essentially purchases an
insurance policy, providing income for his dependents whose economic security is threatened by
cessation of work due to his old age or death. Upon the wage earner’s death, his dependent
children, as beneficiaries of the wage earner’s death proceeds, are thus entitled to benefits—a
318

DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 72 (8th ed. 2009). The intestacy laws of different states may
treat similarly situated children differently for “child” status purposes. For example, while a child in State A may be
entitled to child’s insurance benefits under the Act because his state’s intestacy law provides for posthumously
conceived children, a similarly situated child in State B may not be entitled to such benefits because his state’s
intestacy laws do not provide for posthumously conceived children.
319
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 318, at 75 (noting that the primary policy underlying intestacy statutes is to carry
out the probable intent of the average intestate decedent).
320
See supra Part IV(a)–(b).

48

fact that many intestacy statutes may not consider.
Like the Ninth and Third Circuits’ approach, the Supreme Court’s and Fourth and Eighth
Circuits’ interpretation of the Act declines to make the benefit applicant’s level of actual
dependency on the deceased wage-earner, or lack thereof, the focal point of the courts’ inquiry.
However, this is not the courts’ fault. Indeed, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the
Supreme Court, as a matter of statutory interpretation, have construed the Social Security Act as
it currently is written correctly. The real issue—and this article’s central point— is that the
statute is poorly drafted and fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying
the Act’s passage.
VIII. A Plea for Congress to Amend the Social Security Act So That It Is More Consistent
with the Act’s Legislative Purpose and Clearer for Courts Tasked with Interpreting It
in the Context of Posthumously Conceived Children.
If the goal of Congress is to grant posthumously conceived children child’s insurance
benefits and produce a statute that is consistent with the legislative purpose underlying its
passage, the present text of the statute is inadequate. As discussed above, the American social
security system was based primarily, if not exclusively, on the theories of social insurance and
dependency. It, therefore, is only fitting that dependency lie at the core of any proposed solution
Congress chooses to implement.
One potential dependency-based solution, which would resolve the issues surrounding
posthumously conceived children’s right to child’s insurance benefits, would require Congress to
adopt and implement a statutory provision premised on a theory of vicarious dependency.321
While the concept of “vicarious dependency” does not seem to appear elsewhere in the law, a similarly named
but largely unrelated theory has come up in the sociology context. See, e.g., Clara Sabbagh, The Dimension of
Social Solidarity in Distributive Justice, 42 SOC. SCI. INFO. 255 (2003)
321

[I]n relations of vicarious dependency, an individual can enable the other to attain the desired resource, that
is, the individual delegates (or is expected to delegate) the resource to the other. An example of such a
relationship is the investment parents put into a child and their sense of participation in the achievements
associated with the investment. In such relations, the distance from the other is minor, if not non-existent; the
other is perceived as “me”, resulting in a sense of identification and empathetic involvement towards the
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Under this proposal, eligibility for child’s insurance benefits could be defined under section
402(d)(1)(C) as follows:
“Every child biologically or legally related to an individual entitled to old-age or
disability insurance benefits, or to an individual who dies a fully insured individual, if
such child . . . was dependent or vicariously dependent upon such individual . . . shall be
entitled to a child’s insurance benefit…”

Such a provision not only provides for most, if not all, of the “regularly-conceived”
children currently provided for under sections 416(e) and (h) of the Act, it also allows
posthumously conceived children to establish “dependency” and qualify for child’s insurance
benefits without having to rely on inconsistent state intestacy laws, which may or may not allow
for benefits. The vicarious dependency provision accomplishes this result by automatically
deeming a posthumously conceived child “dependent” on the deceased wage earner if that
child’s surviving parent or legal guardian can establish that he or she was financially dependent
on the deceased wage-earner at the time of his or her death. For example, if it can be established
that a deceased wage-earner is the biological or legal father of a posthumously conceived child,
that child would be entitled to child’s insurance benefits if his or her surviving mother can
establish that she was financially dependent on the deceased wage-earner at the time of his
death.322 The fact that the child itself was not dependent on the wage-earner at the time of his
death thus becomes irrelevant.
While there are, perhaps, several problems with this proposal—for example, the
posthumously conceived child of unmarried parents may not qualify for child’s insurance

other. In addition, each participant in the relationship largely depends on the other for attaining the resources.
In conditions of mutual care, the potential conflict over resources ideally tends to be minimized or cancelled,
since self-interests are identical to the interests of the other. The principle of need is appropriate in relations
of vicarious dependency since one individual feels identical to the other and, in enabling the other to attain
the desired resources, enhances both his or her own and the other’s sense of welfare. Typical examples here
are relations between parents and children or between spouses.

Id. at 264.
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wage-earner, the surviving spouse almost always will be able to establish dependency.
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benefits because his or her surviving parent may not have been financially dependent on the
deceased wage earner at the time of his or her death323—there are also many benefits. For
instance, the proposed solution makes the Act easier for courts to interpret and apply by
eliminating a multitude of unnecessary and arguably conflicting sub-provisions. In addition, by
disregarding the written intent of the insured, i.e., instances where the decedent gave written
consent to the use of his sperm, as well as state intestacy statutes—statutes that supposedly
reflect the presumed intent of a decedent who has not had the opportunity to draw up a will, but
do not reflect the policies and purposes underlying social security benefits—the proposal treats
child’s insurance benefits as what they are, insurance for dependent children of deceased wage
earners, rather than an asset to be given away or withheld.
The proposal also protects a greater number of posthumously conceived children, as
eliminating reliance on state intestacy law and permitting “dependency” to be satisfied
vicariously undoubtedly affords more children access to benefits. To be sure, children conceived
with the egg/sperm of a deceased, anonymous donor likely would not be eligible for benefits, but
this is consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage. Not only does denial
of benefits in these instances prevent Social Security from becoming a general welfare system, it
declines to award benefits where there was no expectation of support.324 What’s more, there still
is likely to be a net increase in the number of posthumously conceived children who are eligible
for benefits, even if some posthumously conceived children may be excluded.
323

Another potential problem lies in the fact that spouses often depend on each other for non-financial reasons.
Perhaps most notably, spouses often are dependent on the labor and/or emotional support provided by the other. For
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Lastly, the proposal expands the definition of “family” to include non-traditional groups,
which are becoming increasingly common in the twenty-first century. For instance, the proposal
allows a child to attain child’s insurance benefits regardless of whether he or she is conceived
after the death of a parent, the biological child of a member of a same-sex marriage or civil
union, or legally adopted, so long as he or she can establish actual or vicarious dependency on
the deceased wage earner. The proposal thus recognizes and supports the non-nuclear family.
At a time when “modern artificial reproduction technologies currently allow for variations in the
creation of child-parent relationships which are not solely dependent upon biology” and “the use
of donor eggs, artificial insemination, and surrogate wombs could result in at least five potential
parents,”325 this is particularly important. Moreover, it is consistent with the Act’s remedial and
humanitarian aims.326
Although there likely are many ways to amend the Social Security Act to make it clearer
for courts tasked with interpreting it in the context of posthumously conceived children, a
dependency-based amendment best comports with and reflects the legislative purpose underlying
the Act’s passage. For this reason, this article recommends that Congress adopt and implement a
statutory provision based on a theory of vicarious dependency. Not only would such a provision
render the Social Security Act easier to interpret and apply, it would also protect a greater
number of posthumously conceived children, support non-traditional families, and deny benefits
where no expectation of support exists.
IX. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court has now resolved the question of whether posthumously
conceived children are entitled to child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security Act and
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 632 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
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how that determination is made, this issue sharply divided the U.S. Courts of Appeal for several
years. This should come as no surprise, however, given the Act’s ambiguity and the fact that
many present-day reproductive technologies “were not within the imagination, much less the
contemplation, of Congress when the relevant sections of the Act came to be.”327 While the
Supreme Court ultimately deemed the Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of the Act—
awarding “child” status to benefit applicants only if they can satisfy one of the criteria outlined in
section 416(h)—correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is clear that neither the Ninth
and Third Circuits’ nor the Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of the Act is entirely
consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage. For this reason, Congress,
which has the last word in determining the scope of survivorship benefits, should intervene,
amending the Social Security Act so that it both corresponds with the Act’s legislative purpose
and is clearer for courts tasked with interpreting it in the context of posthumously conceived
children.

While Congress perhaps can accomplish this goal in many ways, adopting a

dependency-based approach, such as a theory of vicarious dependency, would seem to comport
best with the Act’s legislative purpose. In any event, Congress should act promptly to ensure
that posthumously conceived children—like “regularly-conceived” children—are adequately
provided for.
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